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THIS paper undertakes an inquiry into the nature of individuality, and
reviews doctrines of individualism well entrenched in contemporary American
thought, especially in anthropological theory.
An individual is a distinguishable member of a class of things or events.
One member of a class can be distinguished from others by its discreteness on
the one hand, and by its particular features, on the other. But, even if members
of a class had no particular features, their very discreteness would give each an
individuality. An atom of copper would have individuality even if it were
exactly like every other atom of copper. But no two atoms are exactly alike;
just as no two peas or mice or men are exactly alike. And we could not speak of
two things being exactly alike, or of two things at all, if they were not distinguish-
able discretely. We see individuality, therefore, in its relationship to the con-
tinuum, on the one hand, and to particular characteristics on the other. Given
complete likeness, theoretically, individuality is realized through discreteness.
Given discreteness, individuality may be further expressed through particular
characteristics.
But the factor of discreteness is not as simple as it appears at first glance.
Viewed superficially, a thing or event may appear to be discrete or not-discrete,
with no intermediate positions. Sometimes this is the case, but it is not always so.
The individuality of a brick is determined by its discreteness on the one hand
and by its intrinsic properties on the other; its individuality is not determined
by its relationship to other bricks except in so far as it is a member of a class.
But it is otherwise with living organisms. An ape is an ape. But his indi-
viduality is affected by his relationships with other apes. These relationships
are of two kinds: genetic and sociological. As a physical object, his discreteness
is entire and complete. As a biological organism, his discreteness is complete in
one respect but not in another. He is a complete, autonomous whole, and he
1 This paper was presented at meeting of The American Studies Association of Texas at the
University of Texas, Austin, on November 30, 1962. It is published here through the
courtesy of the American Studies Association and by permission of the University of Texas.
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could continue to exist even if all other apes were suddenly extinguished. But as
a biological organism, his discreteness is not entire and complete; his indi-
viduality has been affected by the organisms of his forebears. He is what he is
because his genetic composition has been determined by those of his parents,
and by their parents in turn. He is both a genotype and a phenotype; his
individuality is a function of both phylogeny and ontogeny.
The individuality of an ape is, therefore, of a different order from that of a
brick. The individuality of the latter is wholly a matter of discreteness within
a uniformity of a class of things. The individuality of the former is the product
of a qualified discreteness, on the one hand, and of variation among the members
of the class, on the other. But the important thing, for our present purposes, is
that the individuality of a brick, in so far as it arises from particular charac-
teristics rather than from mere membership in a class, is not affected, or de-
termined, by other bricks, whereas the biological individuality of the ape is
profoundly affected by other apes.
Individuality among apes is affected by their interrelationships on a socio-
psychological level as well as upon a biological level. The individuality of an
ape is determined not only by his genetic constitution but also by his social
relations with other apes. Apes differ in age, sex, size, strength, prowess, etc.,
and these differences find significant expression in social behavior. The role that
an ape plays in the social life of his troop will be determined by the actions and
interactions of other apes as well as by his own physiological and morphological
properties. In short, the personality - the individuality - of the ape will be
determined socially as well as genetically. So significant is the social factor in
this respect, that a close scientific observer has remarked that &dquo;it is hardly an
exaggeration to say that a chimpanzee kept in solitude is not a real chimpanzee
at all&dquo; (Kohler, 1926, p. 293). He goes on to point out that the behavior of the
chimpanzee, i.e., his social individuality, is a function of the behavior of other
members of his group.
The dependence of chimpanzees, not merely upon the behavior of their
fellows, but upon an actual social tradition that exists in chimpanzee society in
their natural habitat, is vividly set forth by Heini P. Hediger of the Zurich Zoo
and University. Why is it, he asks, that so few chimpanzees have been born in
zoological gardens: &dquo;the number of chimpanzee births lags far behind that, for
example, of giraffes and hippopotami&dquo; (Hediger, 1961, p. 44). The reason, he
says, is that chimpanzees reared in zoos do not know how to perform the act of
copulation.
&dquo;Fully grown chimpanzees are hardly ever caught in Africa, and conse-
quently cannot be exported. The rule is, rather, for babies or barely weaned
young, whose parents have been killed, to reach the zoos, where, over the years,
they develop into sexually mature specimens. In this manner, that is, through
the importation of unknowing young animals, the chain of natural tradition is
interrupted. The young that have grown up in isolation literally do not know
what to do with their sexual urge upon maturity... In many cases, mature pairs,
out of ignorance, never get past the stage of sterile masturbation&dquo; (ibid., p. 45).
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We have here a truly remarkable situation. Among lower forms of life the
act of procreation is performed instinctively. But among the great apes, at least,
and in the human species this kind of behavior must be learned. Now, as we
noted a moment ago, the behavior of a chimpanzee is not merely a function of
the behavior of other chimpanzees, as pointed out by Kohler. It is dependent
upon a social tradition which, in a state of nature, is passed down from one
individual and generation to another. This tradition is broken when chimpanzees
are taken in infancy from their parents and other elders and reared in zoos,
either in solitude or among other chimpanzees similarly divorced from the social
tradition of mating. Therefore, the mere presence of other chimpanzees is not
enough to enable a chimpanzee to perform the act of mating; the actual social
tradition of mating must be there also.
We see, then, in this situation that the individual chimpanzee is not only
dependent upon the behavior of other chimpanzees to bring out and express
his own innate nature, but is dependent upon a social tradition that we can
distinguish logically from the continuum of biological parents and children.
Indeed, the whole species is dependent upon this tradition; without it they could
not mate ; they would become extinct.
The individuality of an ape differs significantly from that of a brick. Among
bricks there is a maximum of discreteness, a minimum - or near minimum -
of particular variation. Among apes, however, discreteness is profoundly
qualified on both the biological level and the socio-psychological level. An ape’s
individuality is a function of - and consequently subordinated to or limited by
- his genetic inheritance, the behavior of his fellows, and social tradition.
Individuality becomes but a more or less particular expression of two conti-
nuums : one biological, the other socio-psychological.
Turning now to the species Homo sapiens, we note that a man may be con-
sidered in three contexts: as a physical object, as a mere animal, and as a human
being. Man is, of course, an animal, but he is a unique animal. Only man is
capable of originating, determining, and bestowing, freely and arbitrarily,
meanings upon things and events in the external world, meanings which cannot
be grasped and appreciated with the senses. Holy water is a case in point. Holy
water is not the same thing as mere tap water. It is distinguished from ordinary
water by a characteristic that is significant to human beings. But this distinguish-
ing characteristic, this meaning or value; cannot be perceived. We call this
ability of man to bestow such meanings the ability to symbol. Symboling includes
the ability to comprehend non-sensory meanings as well as to originate and
bestow them. Symboling, then, consists of traffic in non-sensory meanings.
Articulate speech is another example of symboling and is, probably, its most
important and characteristic form of expression (see &dquo;The Symbol, etc.,&dquo; in
White, 1949a).
All of civilization, or culture, is dependent upon articulate speech. We could
not have ideologies, customs, or institutions without articulate speech. Even the
human use of tools, as distinguished from tool-using among apes, is, as I have
argued elsewhere (White, 1942), dependent upon the ability to symbol. We
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find, therefore, that man, as a human being, inhabits a world of his own, a
unique world, as well as occupying, as a mere animal, the world that apes live
in. A human being is subject to the same influences of gravitation, temperature,
atmospheric pressure, and humidity as an ape - and, indeed, a brick - is. But
here the similarity between the physical worlds of an ape and of a human being
ends. Culture conditions and qualifies all of man’s perceptions - as a human
being - of the external world. He does not see the same sun that an ape sees. To
the ape the sun is merely an optical and thermal object. But to a human being
it is the Sun Father, the Giver of Life, or a huge mass of thermonuclear transfor-
mations.
We turn now to the question of individuality in the human species. A man is
a discrete physical object as a brick is. As a biological organism he is discrete as
an ape is. That is, in so far as he is a complete, autonomous system his discreteness
is complete. But this system, this organism, is not wholly discrete with reference
to other organisms; its characteristics have been determined genetically by
other organisms, namely, his ancestors. But when we turn to the socio-psycho-
logical context, we find that it is culture, rather than mere social interaction or
merely a behavioral tradition that is significant. The individuality of a human
being has, therefore, three determinants: first, the discreteness of a complete,
autonomous animate material system; second, the factor of genetic inheritance
which tends to limit and constrain individuality by making a child resemble
his parents; and, third, the influence of the extra-somatic tradition that we call
culture.
Mere social interaction and social tradition are, as we have seen, factors in
the determination of individuality among apes. Both of these factors are bio-
logically determined. The process of social interaction is determined by such
factors as age, sex, size, strength, health and prowess. Their social tradition - at
least in the conspicuous instance of reproduction - is merely a device to facilitate
the expression and to guarantee the continuity of a biological process. In the
human species, however, both mere social interaction and social tradition are
culturally, rather than biologically, determined. It is not, for example, innate
biological traits that determines the form of the family or the social traditions of
monogamy and polygamy. On the contrary, it is the extra-somatic tradition
that we call culture that determines the behavior of the members of the family.
And culture is an organization, or system, that behaves in accordance with its
own principles and laws. Let us turn, then to this factor and see how it operates
and, specifically, how it affects human individuality.
Culture and man as a human being began simultaneously; both originated
in symboling. Symboling produced culture: an organization of beliefs, customs,
tools, and techniques. In a relatively short time, every society of men acquired
a complete, even though simple and crude, culture, and in so doing these men
became completely humanized. This culture was transmitted from one gener-
ation to another; it flowed down through time indefinitely. It acquired a life of
its own, so to speak. It became a process sui generis, self-contained, self-determin-
ed, and autonomous. To be sure, culture could not exist without human beings.
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But it is not human beings who determine their culture by desire and design;
it is culture that determines the behavior of peoples. The behavior of the culture
process, or of cultural systems, is not a function of the human mind; on the
contrary, the behavior of peoples is a function of the extra-somatic tradition that
is culture (we say peoples, not individuals, because the behavior of an individual
is a function of his biological make-up as well as of his culture). The culture
process, or cultural systems, behave in accordance with principles and laws of
their own. Culture is to be explained culturologically rather than biologically
or psychologically. There is, of course, a necessary and intimate relationship
between culture as a whole and the human species. If man were not the kind of
animal he is, his culture in general would not be what it is. But we cannot explain
variations of culture in terms of the biological factor, man. The problems of
culture history and the evolution of culture do not require for their solution a
consideration of the human organism or species. The culturologist approaches
the problems of culture change as if the human race did not exist.
What is the nature of individuality of human beings within the culture
process (or cultural system) ?1 They have individuality of a sort, but it is so
subordinated to the influence of the extrasomatic tradition of culture as to be
almost an individuality without distinctiveness. It is much like the individuality
of bricks: each is distinct, but all are made of the same materials and designed
in the same way. Let us consider what takes place in the making of a human being.
An infant of the human species is born into a cultural tradition. At birth,
and for some time thereafter, the infant’s potential ability to symbol does not
reach the point of overt expression. The pre-symbol child is not a human being
from the standpoint of kind of behavior. The infant becomes humanized as he
is inducted into his culture through the process of symboling. In this way he
acquires all his knowledge and beliefs, his customs and his codes, his attitudes
and values, his gods and his hells. A human being is a receptacle into which
culture has been poured.
To be sure, the human organism is not a wholly passive object. On the
contrary, it is a dynamic system, a thermodynamic system. It does not merely
undergo experiences; it does something about them. Cultural influences impinge
upon the human organism; elements of culture are introduced into it. And the
human organism, as a dynamic system, lays hold of them, orders them, correlates
and synthesizes them. No two human organisms do this in precisely the same
way, first because no two organisms are exactly alike, and second because the
order in which the organism experiences cultural events is significant. Two
organisms, exactly alike biologically, and reared in the same cultural milieu,
could become different persons as a consequence of the order in which they
underwent certain experiences. Two young women, for example, could (1) go
to college, (2) have a baby, and (3) marry. But the order in which each one did
these things would have a significant effect upon her as an individual.
There is room, then, for individuality among human beings as a consequence
1 See White, 1949b and 1950 for a previous discussion of this subject.
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of ( 1 ) their respective biological differences, (2) differences in the temporal order
in which events are experienced, and (3) variations of the cultural factor itself;
in a complex cultural system one person might be reared in one sub-culture,
another person in another. But the similarity among human beings produced
by a given culture is striking. Culture exerts a powerful and overriding influence
upon the biological organisms of Homo sapiens, submerging the neurological,
anatomical, sensory, glandular, muscular, etc., differences among them to the
point of insignificance.
I remember vividly when, as a youth, I heard for the first time Negroes
speaking French. I had lived in a rural area in the Deep South where all Negroes
spoke, not merely the English language, but a distinctive dialect of that tongue.
Consequently, years later, I experienced a shock of novelty and of unreflecting
surprise when in the West Indies I heard Negroes speaking French - much as if
I had suddenly heard a turkey quack.
Language and dialects impose themselves upon the plastic infant organisms
that come under their influence. To be sure, no two persons speak a dialect in
exactly the same way. But, when one considers the enormous range of biological
differences - the endomorphs and exomorphs, the hypothyroid and the hyper-
thyroid, the prognathous and hypognathous, and all the variations of bony,
muscular and neural structure - the similarity of the product, of the dialect
spoken, is truly impressive. So impressive, in fact, that one well versed in the
geography of dialects can tell where a person was reared by the way he pro-
nounces a few words. And so profoundly does the linguistic tradition influence
the organism of a human being that it becomes virtually impossible for him,
after he has passed the stage of adolescence, to learn to speak another language
without an appreciable accent. It is almost like having been reared a turkey it
becomes impossible to quack. The linguistic tradition is like a radio broadcasting
station; the organism, like the radio that receives the message and reproduces it.
If the culture broadcasts Tibetan, the human radios &dquo;play&dquo; Tibetan; if it
broadcasts a Brooklyn dialect of English, the human organism will reproduce
that.
As it is with language in particular, so it is with culture as a whole. Just as
your culture imposes a language and dialect upon you, so does it equip you with
your beliefs, your customs, your attitudes and values. The individual is but a
particular recreation of his culture.
It is ironical that, notwithstanding the fact that this conception of human
individuality has been developed and validated by cultural anthropology, we
nevertheless find a totally opposed conception which we shall now examine and
which is well established in anthropological theory. In this respect, however,
anthropology does but reflect a more general and popular conception of indi-
viduality. The anthropologists who hold this anthropocentric conception of
individuality do so not because of anthropological science, but in spite of it.
The conception of individuality which we are about to examine is, as we
have just indicated, an anthropocentric one. Thesis: It holds that the human
individual is a complete and self-determined whole, and that he is, moreover,
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a dynamic system, a prime mover, a creator, a first cause. In its extreme form,
this conception insists that only individuals are real - society is merely an
aggregation of individuals, and culture but an abstraction.
This exact opposite of a culturological interpretation was espoused by the
late Franz Boas, who dominated American anthropology for many years after
the turn of the century. &dquo;It seems hardly necessary,&dquo; he wrote, &dquo;to consider
culture a mystic entity that exists outside the society of its individual carriers and
that moves by its own force... The forces that bring about the changes are active
in the individuals composing the social group, not in the abstract culture&dquo;
(Boas, 1932a, pp. 245-46).
Comment
Of course culture is not a mystic entity, but there is a very real sense in which
it has an existence outside of the individuals who comprise a society, All material
culture - buildings, factories, railroads, etc. - have, of course, their objective
being outside individuals. But so also do intellectual and social traditions. The
English language, the Ten Commandments, Euclidean geometry, and codes of
laws had an existence before any of us was born; they enter our minds from the
outside; and they will continue to exist after we are gone. It is self-evident that
culture could not &dquo;move&dquo; were it not for human beings which make the culture
process possible. But from the standpoint of a scientific explanation of the process
of culture change, we do not need to take individuals into account; indeed we
may disregard human beings entirely. We do not need, for example, to concern
ourselves with human beings when we deal with such matters as the diffusion
of the use of tobacco throughout the world after the discoveries of Columbus, or
the evolution of currency, or of the constitutional, parliamentary form of
government. People could not solve problems in algebra or compose symphonies
were it not for respiration. But we do not need to take respiration into account
in a scientific explanation of such behavior.
Thesis
The anthropocentric, anti-culturological point of view is frequently ex-
pressed in the assertion that it is people, not culture, that does things. &dquo;But
culture does not ’work,’ ’move,’ ’change,’ but is worked, is moved, is changed.
It is people who do things...&dquo; says Robert S. Lynd. He goes on to say, &dquo;The
culture does not enamel its fingernails, or vote, or believe in capitalism, but
people do&dquo; (Lynd, 1939, pp. 38, 39). And Edward Sapir, a prominent student
1 "... collective ways of acting and thinking [i.e., culture] have a reality outside the individuals
who, at every moment of time, conform to it. These ways of thinking and acting exist in
their own right. The individual finds them completely formed, and he cannot evade or
change them. He is therefore obliged to reckon with them." Emile Durkheim, The Rules
of Sociological Method. Preface to the second edition, p. lvi (Chicago, 1938).
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of Boas, declares that &dquo;it is always the individual that really thinks and acts and
dreams and revolts&dquo; (Sapir, 1917, p. 442).
Comment
Of course it is people who enamel their fingernails; as a matter of fact,
culture has no fingernails. And thinking and dreaming are processes that have
their loci in individual biological organisms. But the intent and purpose of Lynd
and Sapir are not to utter these commonplaces, but to express a philosophy of
behavior. From the standpoint of science, the question is not who does this or
that, people or culture, but why do people do the things they do. And the reason
why one people enamels their fingernails while another blackens their teeth, or
tatoos their faces, is because they are responding to different extrasomatic
cultural traditions. And as for thinking and dreaming, these are processes which,
by definition, take place within a biological organism. But what the individual
thinks and dreams is determined by his culture: a Hottentot does not think or
dream as does a Frenchman.
Thesis
Some outstanding and influential anthropologists have conceived of the
individual as a First Cause. &dquo;The individual, with his physiological needs and
psychological processes,&dquo; said Malinowski, &dquo;is the ultimate source... of all
tradition, activities, and organized behavior&dquo; (Malinowski, 1939, p. 962).
Similarly, Goldenweiser &dquo;places the individual both at the beginning and at the
end of the social process. Human society,&dquo; he says, &dquo;was built out of the needs,
proclivities and achievements of individuals...&dquo; (Goldenweiser, 1935, p. 75).
Thus, to these students, it is the individual who creates culture. &dquo;It is the indi-
vidual,&dquo; said Ralph Linton, &dquo;who is responsible, in the last analysis, for all
additions to culture. Every new idea must originate with some person&dquo; (Linton,
1938, p. 248). To Edward Sapir, &dquo;any culture element... has radiated out, at
last analysis (the phrase &dquo;last analysis&dquo; suggests that there is nothing more to be
said, L.A.W.), from a single individual&dquo; (Sapir, 1916, p. 43). &dquo;The inventive
process resides in individual organisms,&dquo; says Clark Wissler; &dquo;it is a function
of the individual organism&dquo; (Wissler, 1927, p. 87). Ruth Benedict, too, has
offered an &dquo;in the last analysis&dquo; pronouncement: &dquo;no civilization has in it any
element which in the last analysis is not the contribution of an individual. Where
else could any trait come from except from the behavior of a man or a woman
or a child?&dquo; (Benedict, 1934, p. 253).
Let me hasten to point out that this conception of the individual’s role in
the culture process is not confined to anthropology. William James expressed it
long ago in his essay, &dquo;Great Men, Great Thoughts and the Environment.&dquo;
The genesis of great ideas, and inventions is, he says, &dquo;sudden and, as it were,
spontaneous... [a] conception... is a spontaneous variation in the strictest sense
of the term... [inventions such as the yard-stick, the balance, the chronometer]
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and all other institutions were flashes of genius in an individual head, of which
the outer environment showed no sign&dquo; (James, 1880, pp. 456-58; emphasis mine).
Comment
It all seems so simple and so obvious: where else could an invention occur,
a new culture trait originate, except in the mind of &dquo;a man or a woman or a
child&dquo;? Simple and obvious, perhaps, but so anthropocentric. How could a
human individual, divorced from culture, invent or originate anything cultural?
In the first place, as we have already seen, an individual, divorced from a cultural
milieu would not be a human being; he would be a mere hominid. Furthermore,
without cultural material to work with the individual could do nothing of
cultural significance. An invention - a new conception, a new tool, or a new
institution - is a novel permutation or combination of culture traits effected
within the interactive process that is a cultural tradition. An invention - the
steam engine, for example - is a synthesis of already existing cultural elements -
the technique of making fire, metallurgy, cylinders, pistons, cranks and wheels.
The steam engine has a genealogy. It is the culturological descendant of many
elements of culture, each of which in turn can be traced back in time, sometimes
to remotest antiquity, such as is the case of fire-making. The &dquo;invention of the
steam engine&dquo; was not a single event, achieved by a single individual, but a
socio-technological process involving the labor of scores of individuals in several
nations over a period of more than a century. The fact that dozens of inventions
and discoveries have been made simultaneously by two - sometimes several -
persons working quite independently of one another is a significant indication of
cultural determination rather than of individual initiative or genius. When the
interactive culture process reaches a certain point of development, an invention
or discovery becomes not only possible but inevitable (White, 1949, pp. 168-70,
203-11; see, also, Wm. F. Ogburn and Dorothy Thomas, &dquo;Are Inventions
Inevitable?&dquo; Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 37, pp. 83-98, 1922).
To go back to a point that we have touched upon before, if one means
merely that neurological processes of individual organisms are essential to the
synthesis of elements in the extrasomatic cultural tradition (Kroeber and
Kluckhohn [1952, p. 172] say that &dquo;each new or changed value takes its concrete
origin [as do all aspects of culture] in the psychological processes of some par-
ticular individual), then of course we must grant that this is true. Neurological
processes are essential to the social process of culture change and invention, and
by definition, they are functions of the biological organism, not of the social
organism, or body politic. But to say, as William James did, or to imply as
others have done, that the individual is the creator, the originator, the prime
mover is a gross distortion, an example of crass anthropomorphism. To say that
a man invented something because he was a genius (as William James did) is
one thing; to say that the individual was the locus within which a significant
synthesis of cultural elements took place is quite another. To be sure, one human
organism may be a better neurological locus than another, but we have no way
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of measuring the innate inventive capacity of a nervous system directly. To say
that one who has made a great invention is a genius, i.e., has superior innate
ability, is to make a neurological inference from culturological evidence. And
to account for a great invention in terms of such genius is to explain the known
facts of culturology by the unknown facts of neurology - which is not very good
science.
Thesis
With regard to the question of culture change in general, many anthropo-
logists have held that here also, as in the case of invention, it is the individual
who effects the changes. &dquo;When patterns [of culture, L.A.W.] change,&dquo; says
the British social anthropologist, Raymond Firth, &dquo;it is individuals in the last
resort [sic] who change them&dquo; (Firth, 1951, p. 85). Indeed, they conceive of
individuals standing outside their culture and, by their own actions, changing
it - in the same way that man can, and has, changed natural environments by
deforestation, irrigation or drainage, exterminating vast herds of bison, and
bringing prairies under cultivation. Thus, Franz Boas not only distinguishes
between the culture that he lives in, on the one hand, and his ideals on the other,
but tells us that the culture &dquo;ran counter&dquo; to his ideals (Boas, 1938, p. 204).
Naturally, exceptionally able individuals are more likely to change their
cultures than mediocre ones, according to this thesis. In small groups ofprimitive
peoples, says Lowie (1948, p. 84), &dquo;a few resolute spirits can easily impose an
innovation.&dquo; &dquo;Dominant personalities&dquo; effect changes in art, science, philosophy
and literature, according to Goldenweiser (1922, p. 26). To turn to non-
anthropologists, William James asserts that culture change &dquo;is due to the
accumulated influences of individuals, of their examples, their initiatives, and
their decisions&dquo; (op. cit., p. 242). And Arnold Toynbee - according to Roger
J. Williams - &dquo;makes clear the crucial importance of individual creative souls
in any society and indicates that the breakdown of any civilization is primarily
traced to the failure in the creative power of the individuals who should be like
leaven in the lump&dquo; (Williams, 1950, p. 54).
But it is not only the &dquo;dominant personalities,&dquo; the &dquo;resolute spirits,&dquo; and
the &dquo;creative souls&dquo; who change the course and content of culture, according to
this view. The unstable, the maladjusted, and the non-conformists also produce
changes. William James (op. cit., pp. 456-57) says that a conception &dquo;flashes
out of one brain, and no other, because the instability of that brain is such as to
tip and upset itself in just that particular direction.&dquo;
It is the dissatisfied and the dissident who bring about culture change
according to anthropologist Homer Barnett. &dquo;Finally,&dquo; he says (Barnett, 1941,
p. 171 ), to put the finger on the ultimate source of all cultural change (emphasis mine,
L.A.W.), it may be bold but it is not unreasonable to suggest some kind of
personal conflict as the primary motivation for invention. In other words, there
are good reasons for believing that the inventor is such because he feels, rather
acutely and personally, a dissatisfaction with the customary and accepted ways
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of doing things. This is demonstrably true of the social inventor, the &dquo;liberal,&dquo;
and it is no less reasonable to posit some motor or affective thwartings at the
source of technological inventions.&dquo; Barnett excepts &dquo;the professional inventor
of our nineteenth and twentieth century civilization&dquo; from this generalization.
The professional inventor &dquo;does not really alter the picture,&dquo; says Barnett; he
merely &dquo;adds to it.&dquo; And, finally, Boas (1938, p. 202) believed that culture
changes were brought about, &dquo;in part at least,&dquo; by &dquo;non-conformists.&dquo;
Comment
Here is another simple and easy explanation of the process of culture
change. If an individual doesn’t like his culture he changes it. If he is a &dquo;dominant
personality&dquo; or a &dquo;creative soul&dquo; he modifies or improves his culture as a sculptor
shapes a piece of marble under his hands. Or, if the individual is maladjusted,
if he suffers from &dquo;personal conflicts,&dquo; or is simply a &dquo;non-conformist,&dquo; he sets
about to change the culture and make it more to his liking. Here again we find
the simple, easy, anthropocentric explanation. As a matter of fact, it reminds
us of the Deistic explanations in Genesis. To paraphrase this Book, we might
speak as follows: &dquo;And Man surveyed the culture he had made and was not
pleased with his handwork. He therefore said, ’Let there be change,’ and there
was change.&dquo; Anthropomorphism is simply Deism reduced to human dimen-
sions.
As for Boas’ culture &dquo;running counter to his ideals,&dquo; he obviously had no
understanding of the origin and substance of his ideals. He believed that they
originated within himself, not only independently of his culture but in opposition
to it. He did not realize that he was born without ideals and that had he grown
up outside a cultural tradition he would have had no more ideals than a gorilla;1
or, that if he had been reared in a Tibetan household he would have acquired
different ideals. Boas’ ideals were expressions of his culture just as his language,
beliefs, and table manners were. The opposition between his ideals and his
culture was due to the fact that a complex culture like our own is not homo-
geneous and wholly self-consistent. On the contrary, it is divided against itself
at many points. Boas’ personal conflict was also a conflict within his culture.
I shall not criticize in detail the Great Man theory of history here inasmuch
as I have done so at some length elsewhere (e.g., in &dquo;Ikhnaton : the Great Man
vs. the Culture Process,&dquo; &dquo;Genius: Its Causes and Incidence,&dquo; &dquo;Cultural
Determinants of Mind,&dquo; etc., in The Science af Culture.) The culturologist does not
maintain that the individuality of human beings is wholly irrelevant to a
1 The individual "is nothing, at best an idiot; only through spoken intercourse in society
does he become conscious of thought, is his nature realized. The thought of society, social
thought, is the primary result and the thought of the individual is won by later analysis
from it" Adolph Bastian, Die Vorgeschichte der Ethnologie, p. 79; 1890. These words were
quoted by Ludwig Gumplowicz in The Outlines of Sociology, p. 45 (Philadelphia, 1899),
who commented: "These words are golden and we shall accept them as the motto of
sociology."
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scientific explanation of the process of culture change. Human organisms are
the medium through which the culture process expresses itself; they are the
instruments by means of which the culture process effects its changes and
produces its results. And, since no two human organisms are alike in neurological,
glandular, muscular, sensory, etcetera, structure and organization, the behavior
of the culture process is conditioned by biological variations. No two people
speak the English language exactly alike, and the particular and unique
biological characteristics of the organism which is the head of a state affect the
behavior of that sociocultural system. But, we might note four significant facts
here in this connection.
In the first place, the Great Man, as a head of state, is a person who has been
selected by a sociocultural system, i.e., the nation, and placed in that position.
Hitler was placed at the head of the German nation by the nation itself, operating,
of course, as all modern nations do through the groupings of powerful political,
economic industrial, and military forces; it was not the little rabble rouser who
captured the German nation single handed. A person becomes a Great Man in
history when and because he is placed, by forces and agencies outside himself,
in the midst of powerful cultural processes. Had not the Civil War come along
and swept Ulysses S. Grant into its vortex, he would have remained an obscure
and insignificant clerk in his father’s leather store in Galena, Illinois.
Secondly, anyone who is selected by a sociocultural system and placed in
a position of political power is, and must be, a person who is susceptible to social
influence and the more the better; a person who was wholly impervious to social
influence would not only not be an asset, but a serious liability.
Thirdly, to be a significant factor in the process of sociocu;ltural change, a
man does not need to be a &dquo;dominant personality&dquo; or a &dquo;creative soul.&dquo; In fact,
he may be a most mediocre person. If we grant - as we do - that the course of
the Russian Revolution in 1917 was appreciably, or even profoundly, affected
by the unique and innate traits of Nicolai Lenin, then we must also admit that
a stupid and nondescript switchman could have had a like influence upon the
course of events if he had forgotten to close a switch, thus wrecking the train
which was bringing Lenin to Petrograd, and killing Lenin. Indeed, the course of
history can be significantly affected by non-human beings. It was a goose who
saved Rome, and Mrs. O’Leary’s cow set the city of Chicago on fire.
Finally, the head of a great state has actually less individuality and freedom
of action than an ordinary citizen in lesser walks of life. The President of the
United States today enjoys less freedom of action and has fewer choices of
alternatives than I. In his public and his personal life he is under constant
surveillance and control by secret service men, newspaper reporters, and by the
general public. He is not as free to do as he pleases, to go where he wishes, as
I am. I could go to a Florida resort for a long week end with a spouse not my
own with much greater anonymity and with fewer risks than could the President.
With regard to decisions, I have greater freedom and control. The President’s
decisions can hardly be called his own at all. He is &dquo;briefed&dquo; by his aides,
counselled by his advisors, pushed and pulled by countless political factions and
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economic interests. His &dquo;decisions,&dquo; therefore, are but the expression of an
integration and synthesis of literally thousands of social and political processes
which belong to the body politic. The chief executive is but the meter which
measures them and the mouthpiece which gives them expression. And I compose
my own lectures; no one writes them for me.
To test our theory, let us imagine the President making a decision of his
own. Suppose that he should, upon arising some morning, decide and declare
that the United States should immediately and forthwith embark upon a
program of absolute and complete unilateral disarmament. This would come
about as close to being a decision of his own as would be possible. What would
be the consequences? It is likely that the President would be quietly and
unostentatiously removed to some secluded sanitarium where he could do no
harm. In certain &dquo;non-democratic&dquo; countries he might well be shot or poisoned.
The nation could not tolerate such an individual. The sudden termination of
our vast munitions industries and the collapse of our economic system could not
be permitted to take place.
But I am not a wholly free, discrete, autonomous individual, either. I must
work within the limits of the structure and behavior of my University; and I
must behave within the boundaries of the folkways and mores of my residential
community. I do indeed compose my own lectures, but that simply means that
I synthesize materials bestowed upon me by a scientific tradition. I can decide
- but again within the limits of the Department of Anthropology - whether I
will give a course on ethnological theory or primitive economics. But I cannot
tell my students that man was created in the year 4004 B.C., or that the earth is
flat and motionless. In my private life - and I have much more life that is private
than does the President - I have much freedom to come and go as I please, and
do what I wish. But always as a consequence of the values and goals that my
culture has given me.
There is emphasis upon individuality and individualism at still another
point in American anthropology. Franz Boas was &dquo;of Jewish extraction&dquo;
(Lowie, 1947, p. 310). The exasperating phenomenon of anti-Semitism was of
much concern to Boas not only in his formative years, as Kluckhohn and
Prufer (1959, p. 10), have pointed out, but throughout his entire life. Many of
his more prominent students were Jewish, also.’- As members of a minority
group, many anthropologists of the Boas school were much concerned with the
question of racial conflicts. The Mind of Primitive Man ( 1911; rev. ed., 1938),
undoubtedly Boas’ best known book, has race as its central thesis, and Race and
Democratic Society, a volume of essays and lectures by Boas, published posthu-
mously (1945), is much concerned with race problems.
In his discussion of race Boas exalts the individual and minimizes the
significance of race. &dquo;Many hereditary characteristics,&dquo; he says, &dquo;are not racial
1 John Sholtz, writing in Reflex : a Jewish Magazine, comments upon "the disproportionate
position held by Jewish scientists" in the field of anthropology in the United States, p. 9.
("Durkheim’s Theory of Culture," Reflex, 6:9-12, 1935).
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in character, but must be assigned to family lines... any generalized charac-
terization of a race must be misleading&dquo; (Boas, 1945, p. 26). And &dquo;if it can be
shown that each family line differs in its hereditary traits from all others then
it would be impossible to speak... of hereditary traits common to the whole
group [i.e., race]&dquo; (ibid., p. 31). As a matter offact, Boas comes rather close to
making race disappear. &dquo;When we talk about the characteristics of a race as a
whole,&dquo; he says, &dquo;we are dealing with an abstraction which has no existence in
nature&dquo; (ibid., p. 70). If it could be shown that races do not really exist, then a
logical basis for racial prejudice and discrimination would be removed. Un-
fortunately, prejudice does not need a logical basis in order to flourish.
Boas made a desperate effort to subordinate race to the individual. He does
not go as far as to say that a race is &dquo;nothing but&dquo; a plural number of individuals.
But he does quote &dquo;the eminent German anthropologist, Eugen Fischer, [who]
went so far as to say - before the Hitler revolution - that every individual is a
racial unit&dquo; (ibid., p. 44). And again and again he declares that members of
minority groups &dquo;have the right to be treated as individuals, not as members of
a class [race] &dquo; (ibid., p. 79). &dquo;According to our modern theoretical standards,&dquo; he
says, &dquo;we maintain that justice should be given to the individual, that it should
not be meted out to him as to a representative of his class [race]&dquo; (ibid., p. 79).
Other members of the Boas school were ardent individualists, also. In his
essay, &dquo;Why I am not a Marxist,&dquo; Goldenweiser gives, as one of the reasons, at
least, that he was an arch individualist (Goldenweiser, 1935, p. 75). And, as we
have already seen, Sapir regarded the individual as a prime mover, the creator
and determinant of the culture process.
This emphasis upon the individual in American anthropology had much
to do, in my opinion, with the origin and development of the &dquo;Personality and
Culture&dquo; movement that was so popular during the 1930s. As early as 1923,
according to Ruth Benedict, a close associate and colleague of Boas, Professor
Boas believed that his campaign to establish diffusionism in the place of
evolutionism had been successful, and that &dquo;as he saw it, anthropology should
spend its energies answering these questions of the interplay of the individual
and culture&dquo; (Benedict, 1943, p. 61). In 1930 Boas stressed the need for &dquo;a
penetrating study of the individual under the stress of the culture in which he
lives&dquo; as opposed to studies of historical reconstruction (Boas, 1930, p. 269).
In his Presidential address to the American Association for the Advancement
of Science in 1932, he observed that &dquo;problems of the relation of the individual
to his culture... have received too little attention. The standardized anthropo-
logical data that inform us of customary behavior, give no clue to the reaction
to his culture, nor to an understanding of his influence upon it. Still, here lie the
sources of a true interpretation of human behavior. It seems a vain effort to search for
sociological [not cultural, or culturological, L.A.W.] laws disregarding what t
should be called social psychology, namely, the reaction of the individual to
culture. They can be no more than empty formulas that can be imbued with life only by
taking account of individual behavior in cultural settings&dquo; (Boas, 1932b, pp. 257-59;
emphases mine, L.A.W.) . And in one of the last articles he ever wrote, published
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posthumously, Boas could say that &dquo;one of the characteristic traits of modern
anthropology&dquo; was &dquo;the emphasis laid on the relation between individual and
culture...&dquo; (Boas, 1943, pp. 313-14).
Thus we find in the social philosophy and social science of American scholars
a coherent philosophy of reality: of society, culture, and the individual. In this
philosophy, the individual is not only first and foremost, but in extreme cases,
the only reality. &dquo;Every society,&dquo; says Ralph Linton, &dquo;is, in the last analysis, a
group of individuals&dquo; (Linton, 1945, p. xiv). But a society is merely a &dquo;conceptual
construct&dquo; (Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945, p. 80), and culture but an imperceptible
abstraction (see White, 1959a, pp. 227-28). If culture is imperceptible does it
really exist? One anthropologist has summarized contemporary thinking on this
point by declaring that &dquo;culture has no ontological reality&dquo; (Spiro, 1951, p. 24).
In its extreme form, this philosophy holds that only the individual is real. This
is more frequently implicit than explicit. But sometimes it is asserted in a
forthright manner. We recall a distinguished German sociologist, Georg Simmel
(1858-1918), who, after surveying phenomena ordinarily called social and
cultural, declared that &dquo;it is certain that in the last analysis only individuals
exist&dquo; (Simmel, 1898, p. 665; see, also, Vierkandt, 1934, p. 61).
We hold that this philosophic view of man and culture is but a simple, and
rather crude form of anthropocentrism. Its concepts rest directly upon and
immediately express, percepts. One can see an individual, therefore he exists.
One cannot see culture therefore it &dquo;has no ontological reality.&dquo; This view is
made explicit by one of the anthropologists in Kluckhohn and Kelly’s imaginary
symposium (1945, p. 81). He expresses his dissatisfaction with the concept of
culture, saying: &dquo;I maintain that we would get further if we stuck to human
interaction with other humans and with the natural environment. You can see
those things, but has any of you ever seen ’culture’?&dquo;
This self-imposed limitation upon the intellect is pathetic. One might argue
that no one ever saw a vegetable, but only carrots, onions, etc.; or that no one
can see a university, but only this building and that. &dquo;Vegetable&dquo; is the name of
a class of phenomena, and members of this class can certainly be seen. &dquo;Uni-
versity&dquo; is the name of interrelated, real, observable things and events. To limit
the exercise of the intellect to optical perception is to make science utterly
impossible. No one ever saw the solar system with his eyes, but only the sun and
planets. But the scientist &dquo;sees&dquo; with the eyes of his mind, not merely with his
retina, optic nerve, and so on. The naivet6 of the anthropomorphic conception
of culture is made apparent by imagining the observer equipped with a different
kind of eyes. Suppose he had eyes that could clearly distinguish the cells of the
human body. Then he would declare that &dquo;in the last analysis&dquo; - he would, of
course, have to say, &dquo;in the last analysis&dquo; - only cells are real; a human being is
merely an anatomical construct. If he had eyes that could distinguish molecules
or atoms, then they would, in the last analysis, be the only realities. And if he
had the ultimate in microscopic vision, he would find that only electrons,
protons, mesons, etc., are real, that even atoms are but logical constructs. And,
at the other end of the spectrum, if our observer had macroscopic vision perhaps
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he could not see individuals at all, but only crowds; only forests, no trees. Are
we to tolerate a philosophy in which the nature of reality is determined by
variations of optical perception?
To be sure, science must postulate a real world external to and inde-
pendent of the observer’. And our knowledge and understanding of this external
world must arise out of and depend upon our sensory perceptions of it (see
Einstein, 1936, pp. 350 et passim). But to think of perceptions as the starting
point of knowledge and understanding is one thing; to limit conceptions to the
narrow boundaries of perceptions is quite another matter. And it is conceptions
that count in science.
One might argue that one cannot see a football team, but only the individual
players. But then he would be obliged to say, if he were consistent, that he could
not see a quarterback at all, because a quarterback is an individual in a network
of relationships and one cannot see &dquo;a network of social relationships&dquo;. Similarly,
one could not see a slave because he could perceive only the biological object, not
the institution ofslavery. Corn and cotton are not commodities per se; they become
commodities only when they are significant in certain contexts. These contexts
are not observable via the retina and optic nerve; they are conceptions. And con-
ceptions are the building blocks of science. One cannot well imagine a more ef-
fective way to sabotage scientific endeavor than to limit it to sensory perceptions.
To return now to the three major concepts of the science of man and his
work: the individual, society, and culture.
The individual is first of all, a physical object. It is discrete, it has weight and
dimensions. And, although it resembles other members of its class, it can be
distinguished from them by its possession of more or less particular charac-
teristics. Secondly, an individual is a biological organism. A biological organism
is, of course, still a physical object, but it is one whose individuality has been
determined in part by other biological organisms, namely, its ancestors. As a
biological organism, an individual is an expression of a network of relationships
as well as being a discrete and autonomous system. Thirdly, a member of the
species Homo sapiens would, as a mere animal, be a member of a society if there
were in actuality any such thing as human men apart from culture. Man cannot,
therefore, be merely a social animal, but only a socio-cultural animal which is not
a mere animal but a human being (see White, 1959b). Finally, a human indi-
vidual is a member of a socio-cultural system. As such, his individuality is
determined by the extrasomatic cultural tradition in which he lives as well as
by his own biological equipment. And, as we have seen, the cultural tradition
completely overrides the biological basis of behavior, at least as far as groups,
peoples, are concerned. And even in the case of individual organisms one’s
religion, values, customs and beliefs are determined by one’s culture rather
than by one’s nerves, glands, muscles and sense organs.
To return to Simmel’s dictum that only individuals are real, we must ask
1 "The belief in an external world independent of the perceiving subject is the basis of all
natural science" (Einstein, The World As I See It, p. 60, New York, 1934).
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what is the nature of the reality - or of the several realities - that the human
individual has. We have just reviewed the three levels of reality: physical,
biological, and socio-cultural. Every individual is, by definition, a member of
a class. As a physical obj ect, a human individual is both discrete and independent.
As a biological organism it is discrete in one sense but a point in a network of
genetic relationships in another. And as a human being the individual is
primarily and predominantly an expression of a particular synthesis of cultural
elements; his individuality is even less as a human being than as a biological
organism. As Karl Marx observed many years ago: &dquo;But the essence of man is
no abstraction inherent in each separate individual. In its reality it is in the
ensemble of social relations&dquo; (V Ith of the Theses on Feurbach).
What then are we to say about society and culture whose reality has often
been questioned or denied, in contrast with the attribution of reality to indi-
viduals ? As soon as we disabuse ourselves of the notion that only those things
that we can see are real, and after we have distinguished between seeing with
retinas and optic nerves, on the one hand, and, on the other, seeing with the
mind’s eye, the eye of science, we shall have no trouble.
Society is the name that we give to a plural number of individuals who
interact with one another. A society is a network of relationships among indi-
viduals. The relationships and the network are as real as the individuals. It is
nonsense to say that the Earth is real and the Sun is real - because we can see
them - but that the relationship between them is not real because we cannot see
it. &dquo;Relationship&dquo; is a concept in the mind of the scientist, but the concept
corresponds to an observable reality in the external world. It is the same with
&dquo;fox,&dquo; &dquo;gene,&dquo; or &dquo;electron.&dquo; These are both concepts and things or events in
the external world.
And so it is with &dquo;culture.&dquo; &dquo;Culture&dquo; is the name that anthropological
science has given to a class of phenomena. These phenomena are as real as stars
or atoms, and, like stars and atoms, they exist in the external world, locatable
in terrestrial time and space. Culture is the name of things and events dependent
upon man’s unique ability to symbol, considered in an extrasomatic context
(White, 1959a, p. 234). &dquo;Things and events dependent upon symboling&dquo; include
language, beliefs, customs, tools, utensils, works and forms of art, and so on.
A thing or event is said to be in a somatic context when it is considered in terms
of its relationship to the human organism. It is in an extrasomatic context when
it is considered, not in terms of its relationship to the human organism, but in
terms of itself and in terms of its relationship to other things and events. Thus,
when we consider the mother-in-law taboo in a somatic context we are concerned
with the conceptions, attitudes and acts of the persons concerned. When we
consider it in an extrasomatic context we are concerned with the relationship
of this taboo to other customs such as place of residence after marriage, the
division of labor between the sexes, customs of inheritance, and so on. Things
dependent upon symboling considered in a somatic context we call human
behavior; when considered in an extrasomatic context we call them culture (see
White, 1959a, p. 231).
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To say that society and culture are not real because one cannot &dquo;see&dquo; them
is nonsense, scientific nonsense. One might as well say that the solar system or the
Supreme Court is not real. Or, as we have said before, one might as reasonably
argue that the individual is not real, that only cells, molecules, atoms, or sub-
atomic particles are real. Anthropomorphism, anthropocentrism - the exaltation
of the individual human being - as a philosophic tradition is old and well
established in the cultures of the world. It is not only pre-scientific; it is anti-
scientific. It is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, obstacle to the achievement
of the sciences of man, culture and society that we can think of. But, in compe-
tition with the non-anthropomorphic conceptions of science it will eventually
be rendered obsolete and liquidated.
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